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Part One
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Introduction
In this paper, I will analyze why terrorist groups want to “go” nuclear, what motivates
these nuclear desires, and I will consider how terrorists are likely to act if they were to acquire a
nuclear weapon. I argue that the common perception of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism is
misguided on several levels and that the disproportionate focus on Islamic Extremism is
unreasonable and irresponsible.
Terrorists are rational and strategic actors. Terrorism is inherently political and is a means
to an end. Nuclear weapons are strategically symbolic not objects of strategic defense in the
conventional sense, although the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are unimaginable.
States want nuclear weapons because of the power they hold, the image they portray, and for
deterrence. Terrorist groups want them for mostly the same reasons, especially ones who want to
establish a state, as they mimic state behavior. Destructive capabilities aside, nuclear weapons
almost guarantee power and influence in global politics and protect territorial sovereignty. Both
of those things are exclusively reserved for states, and they would like to keep it that way.
Islamic extremist groups like al-Qaeda and Daesh have been the central concern shaping efforts
to counter nuclear terrorism. This almost exclusive focus on Islamic extremist groups has
resulted in an insufficient approach, as it has allowed other groups, like AWD, to fly under the
radar.
The way that terrorism, as a phenomenon, is understood is constantly changing. There
isn’t a definition that adequately represents all of the layers of terrorism, making it almost
impossible to point to what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence.
Despite the apparent absence of a concrete definition, most people have a vague idea or
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impression of what terrorism is but lack a more precise, concrete, and truly explanatory
definition of the word.1 For the purpose of this paper, I will frame terrorism around Lionel
McPherson’s understanding, which is the deliberate use of force against ordinary
non-combatants, which can be expected to cause broader fear among them for political ends.2
Beyond their destructive capabilities, nuclear weapons are highly strategic. They are the
ultimate symbol of power, and the prospect of a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of the
wrong people is horrifying. In the wake of 9/11, the United States went to great lengths to
prevent future attacks. Two decades after the launch of the Global War on Terrorism, there is a
looming fear of another large-scale terrorist attack. So it is understandable that the threat of a
terrorist group detonating a nuclear weapon is considered to be one of the foremost security
threats today.
Despite increased surveillance monitoring and counterterrorism activities, it seems that it
is getting easier and easier to acquire or build a nuclear weapon. If a terrorist group went nuclear,
it would fundamentally change the state system. In all contexts, nuclear proliferation is a major
global security concern, and when this proliferation involves non-state groups, it becomes more
concerning. States see proliferation as a threat because there is a fear that the more actors with
nuclear capabilities, the more likely it is that a nuclear device will be detonated,3 sovereignty will
be infringed upon, and the international system will be destabilized.
If a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear weapon, it is unlikely they would be
detonated, as it would be counterproductive and illogical. Detonation is not out of the question

1

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 1.
Lionel K. McPherson, "Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?," Ethics 117, no. 3 (2007): 525,
https://doi.org/10.1086/512781.
3
Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International
Security 21, no. 3 (1996): https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273.
2
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entirely, but it just does not make sense rationally or strategically. The opportunity cost and
group survival are reason enough to refrain from detonating the weapon.
In this paper, I argue that the monolithic view of nuclear terrorism is flawed. This
fundamental error is a product of the acquisition-use presumption. I analyze why a variety of
terrorist groups want to “go” nuclear, what motivates these nuclear desires, and consider how
terrorists are likely to act if they were to acquire a nuclear weapon. I argue that the common
perception of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism is misguided on several levels, and that the
disproportionate focus on Islamic extremism is unreasonable and irresponsible. The foundations
of this thesis are built upon several assumptions. Terrorists are rational and strategic actors.
Terrorism is inherantly political, and is a means to an end. Nuclear weapons are not
conventionally defensive, they are instead objects of strategic symbolism.

Case Studies
In my analysis of why terrorist groups want to “go” nuclear, I focus on four specific
groups, al-Qaeda, Daesh,4 Atomwaffen Division (AWD), and Aum Shinrikyo. Although the
focus of this paper is on non-state groups, states are useful as case studies for the realities of
nuclear proliferation. This paper will offer two case studies, one looking at France and the other
looking at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). To date, no terrorist group has
gone nuclear, so states are the only cases available for looking at nuclear proliferation and
acquisition.

4

I will refer to the Islamic State as Daesh. The official name for the Islamic State in arabic is “al-Dawlah
al-Islamīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām”, translating to the Islamic state in Iraq and al-Sham (the Levant), and Daesh is
the acronym of this official name. Labeling the group as ISIS, ISIL or IS not only legitimizes the group as a state,
and as Islamic, but it also has some challenges in the distinction between ISIS and ISIL, they refer to the same
region, "al-Sham," (the Levant which includes Syria). Therefore, this paper will be referring to this group as Daesh,
rather than the Islamic State.
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In order to demonstrate the unorthodox utility that comes from nuclear proliferation and
the procurement of nuclear weapons, I will examine the French nuclear program. I will discuss
what the motivations are for states to “go” nuclear if not for the purpose of strategic defense. I
will also question if a state can justify prioritizing this kind of project over basic state
responsibilities and programs. The French case exposes how irresponsible nuclear proliferation
can be and it undercuts the notion that nuclear weapons are objects of strategic defense. Whereas
the case of the DPRK demonstrates the power that comes from the development and possession
of nuclear weapons. I will consider the initial motivations compared to the eventual outcomes of
establishing a nuclear program, discuss the consequences of this decision for the DPRK, and
consider what that means for terrorist groups with nuclear desires.

Key Understandings of Definitions and Theoretical Framework
Definitions
Terrorism
The way that terrorism is understood is always changing, and to every definition there are
exceptions. As a phenomenon, terrorism is incredibly difficult to pinpoint. There isn’t a
definition that adequately represents a concept as complex as terrorism, making it almost
impossible to point to what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence.
Despite the apparent absence of a concrete definition of terrorism, most people have a vague idea
or impression of what terrorism is but lack a more precise, concrete, and truly explanatory
definition of the word.5 The intentional harm to the innocent, primarily non-combatants, in the
pursuit of a political goal is the hallmark of terrorism. This paper frames terrorism as the

5

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 1.
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deliberate use of force against ordinary noncombatants, which can be expected to cause wider
fear among them, for political ends.6
The dominant view of terrorism is that it is blatantly wrong, and comparable to murder.
War on the other hand is usually understood to be necessary and a form of legitimate violence
when carried out by a state. Generally, war is understood to be justified, and terrorism unjustified
and illegitimate. However, when compared with terrorism, war can be morally worse. The idea
of a moral boundary between terrorism and war is complicated by Just War Theory. Terrorism
and war can both be justified, but when considering Just War Theory and the strategies of states
and those of terror groups, it becomes clear that terrorism is not necessarily worse than war.7 The
legitimacy of violence is of course subjective, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter. Terrorism is strategic in nature and while it is generally regarded as illegitimate violence
in the public imagination, when compared to conventional war, terrorism is not distinctively
wrong.

Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons are strategic. They offer nuclear deterrence, and national security which
comes from the “awesome power” of nuclear weapons.8 States who have nuclear weapons are
part of an elite club, which distinguishes those who have them from those who do not. The Great
Powers have sophisticated nuclear programs, and as a result, have greater global influence.
Nuclear weapons are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and
internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of

6

McPherson, "Is Terrorism," 525.
Virginia Held, "Terrorism and War," The Journal of Ethics 8, no. 1 (2004) http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115781.
8
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. 3rd ed. New York:
W.W. Norton &, (2013), 34.
7
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modernity and identity.9 Despite the unconventional means of security nuclear weapons offer,
they are the ultimate source of security for the elite group of states who have them.
Above all else, nuclear weapons are symbolic of status and are developed to symbolize
state power, modernity, legitimacy as well as project a perceived national identity. With this
nuanced understanding, nuclear acquisition seems to be a dead-end, defense wise. After all, if
nuclear weapons are not for strategic defense, then why do states go to such great lengths to “go”
nuclear? And why would a terrorist group risk survival for this status?
William Epstein, former Director of the UN Disarmament Division, discusses the
divergent incentives and disincentives considered when states decide whether or not to go
nuclear in his article “Why States Go -- And Don't Go -- Nuclear.” He argues that the reasons
states decide to go nuclear are different for each state, arguing that it is generally a combination
of military, political, and economic concerns and motivations. Epstein explains that states see
nuclear weapons as a way to promote their security, enhance their prestige, augment their
influence, and improve their economic condition.10 While Epstein’s argument is centered around
states it is applicable to non-states as well.

Theoretical Framework and Assumptions
Social Identity Theory
Social Identity Theory (SIT) is integral when looking at the role that nuclear weapons
play in shaping state identity. SIT explains how individual identity is shaped by membership in a

9

Sagan, "Why Do States," 55.
William Epstein, "Why States Go -- and Don't Go -- Nuclear," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 430 (1977): 17, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1042354.
10
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particular social group.11 This theory proposes that if a state experiences a decline in status, the
state will engage in strategies of identity management. Specifically, strategies that relate to
competition and mobility as a means to reverse this perceived decline. Therefore, based on the
assumptions of social mobility strategy, states participate in social assimilation strategy in order
to improve their status. Through these assimilation efforts, the group of perceived lesser status
attempts to replicate the characteristics associated with the group of higher status. Essentially,
dress for the job you want, not the job you have.
Tina Fey’s Mean Girls is an incredible example of this theory. The film closely depicts
how social capital can be replicated to raise the social status of less popular people. Here, less
popular people strive to assimilate by adopting physical attributes and behaviors displayed by the
Plastics (a group of extremely popular yet superficial high school girls who dictate the social
hierarchy at their school). In this scenario where the nuclear club is the Plastics, Regina George
is the United States, Cady Heron could be al-Qaeda or DPRK, and Gretchen Wieners, a member
of the Plastics who only wants Regina's acceptance, might be Israel. In other words, if a state
wants to be part of a group, they mimic the behavior of the members of that group in order to
assimilate and fit in.
In The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, Michelle Murray discusses
recognition and the problem of social uncertainty. Proposing that state identity formation
depends unavoidably on recognition,12 maintaining that a state’s social status is always the
socially constructed political effect of its interactions. These interactions with other states shape
state identity as they either confirm or contradict how the state’s self image. Murray explains that

11

Saul McLeod, "Social Identity Theory." Simply Psychology. January 01, 1970.
https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html.
12
Michelle K. Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising
Powers (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 46.
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this “inherently social process of identity formation presents states with a problem: states can
never discern beforehand the recognition responses of other states and as a result can never be
certain about the future security of their social identity,”13 affirming that their social identity is
crucial to their survival as political actors. In this way, nuclear programs are a security
mechanism for state identity. Nuclear programs operate as a mechanism for legitimacy and as an
essential element to their survival as modern states. It becomes clear then that states arm
themselves not because weapons perform a particular security function—they are effectively
useless as instruments of national defense—but rather because such practices are constitutively
linked to the maintenance of sovereignty and state identity.14
SIT explains how individual identity is shaped by membership in a particular social
group.15 This understanding must be taken into account when considering the role that nuclear
weapons play in shaping state identity, and examined when analyzing the nuclear desires of
terrorist groups. Based on these assumptions, states participate in social assimilation strategy in
order to improve their status. Patterns of social assimilation are present in the behavior of
terrorist groups as well, making SIT applicable to non-state groups too.

Proportionality principle
Historically, simply killing a lot of people has seldom been an objective of terrorists.
Instead of wholesale bloodshed, “terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force
necessary.”16 Terrorists “find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few is sufficient for
their purposes.”17 The proportionality of means is important to terrorist groups when planning an
13

Murray, The Struggle, 46.
Murray, The Struggle, 51.
15
McLeod, "Social Identity"
16
Brian Michael Jenkins. “The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism” (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
P-7119, July 1985), 6.
17
Jenkins, “The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism” 6.
14
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attack. Terrorists believe that only if their violence is calculated or regulated will they be able to
obtain the popular support or international recognition they crave, or achieve the political ends
that they desire. It is for this reason that if a non-state group were to go nuclear, they would not
carry out mass casualty attacks, simply because there is little reason for them to kill a large
number of people when the death of a handful can be just as impactful.
In the case of nuclear weapons, this logic is taken further with the argument that there are
few realistic demands that terrorists can make by threatening the use of such indiscriminate
weapons and little that they can accomplish by using them that they could not achieve otherwise.
In other words, the terrorists’ aims and objectives could just as easily be realized through less
extreme measures than the detonation of a nuclear device. Walter Laqueur articulates this idea
simply, “it can be taken for granted that most of the terrorist groups existing at present will not
use weapons of mass destruction, either as a matter of political principle or because it would
defeat their purpose.” 18

Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory is central to the value of nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether or
not one believes that deterrence is responsible for the long peace, it is largely uncontested that
deterrence is at the heart of nuclear strategy and proliferation. In essence, deterrence is a strategy
intended to dissuade an adversary from taking action by the threat of reprisal, or to prevent it
from doing something that another state desires.19 In the simplest terms, nuclear deterrence is the
idea that if one state has a nuclear weapon, they are able to deter their adversaries.

18

Jenkins, “The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism” 31.
Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Deterrence." Encyclopedia Britannica, June 12, 2017.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy.
19
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Nuclear weapons make the cost of war too high, which according to this theory results in
peace, or at least non-war. Deterrence depends on the capacity to actively deny an opponent
victory,20 which is central to why al-Qaeda has an interest in nuclear acquisition. States, or
non-states for that matter, who have nuclear weapons are not attractive targets because the risk of
mutually assured destruction is a clear and present danger.

Accelerationism
Accelerationism, in political theory, is the idea that the proliferation of capitalism should
be accelerated. However, there are several alternative understandings of this idea, and for the
purpose of this paper when accelerationism is referenced, it will be in reference to the white
nationalist understanding. This understanding of the idea refers to the acceleration of conflict
along racial lines by way of terrorism. The use of terror is an intentional choice, which is utilized
as a way to prompt a societal collapse that will allow for the establishment of a white ethnostate.
Essentially, when used in this context, accelerationism as a framework is something of a golden
ticket for white supremacists who are determined to make society as we know it collapse.21 In
this paper, accelerationism is relevant to both Atomwaffen Division and Aum Shinrikyo.

The acquisition-use presumption
Deconstructing and challenging the acquisition-use presumption is central to
understanding the value of nuclear weapons for non-state groups. Outlined by McIntosh and
Storey, this is the presumption that once a nuclear weapon is acquired by a group, they will use it
right away. This presumption overestimates the likelihood of an attack, which results in a limited
20

Michael C. Williams, "Rethinking the 'Logic' of Deterrence," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 17, no. 1
(1992): 76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644732.
21
Anti-Defamation League, "White Supremacists Embrace 'Accelerationism,'" Extremism, Terrorism & Bigotry
(blog), entry posted April 16, 2019, https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-embrace-accelerationism.
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scope of literature surrounding nuclear terrorism. Unfortunately, scholarship is increasingly
focused on whether a terrorist group can acquire a weapon, failing to consider what it would be
used for upon acquisition. In recognizing the shortcomings of this presumption, McIntosh and
Storey offer an alternative approach that “identifies and differentiates the strategic
‘opportunities’ available to terrorist groups once armed with an operational nuclear device.”22
This mode of analysis demonstrates that the threat of a nuclear attack is “much less likely than
typically proposed, even assuming the likelihood of nuclear acquisition.”23 Their alternative
approach is critical to this analysis, as it brilliantly offers a new point of view and fundamentally
changes how the threat is understood in a normative sense.

22

Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey, "Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear
Terrorism," International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 2 (June 2018): 4.
23
McIntosh and Storey, "Between Acquisition," 4.
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Utility of Nuclear Weapons
What are nuclear weapons for?
What are nuclear weapons? What are they used for and why are they so strongly desired
by states, and non-states? What’s the point if they are never even used? Nuclear weapons are
strategic, we know that. Beyond them being strategic though, the answer can get amazingly
complicated. They are strategic weapons yes, but they are not instruments of defense in the
conventional sense, instead nuclear weapons act as instruments of strategic symbolism and are
used to project identity. They offer nuclear deterrence, and national security which comes from
their “awesome power.”24 They also offer entry into an elite club, which distinguishes those who
have them from those who do not. The Great Powers have sophisticated nuclear programs, and
as a result, have greater global influence.
If nuclear weapons are not for strategic defense, then why do states go to such great
lengths to “go” nuclear? Sagan proposes three primary models explaining the incentives of
nuclear acquisition. First, the security or realist, model, which argues that states build weapons
for security and because others do; Second, a “domestic politics” model, which sees nuclear
weapons development as the outcome of actions by powerful coalitions within states that seek
institutional power via this end; and, finally, a “norms” model, which argues that “weapons
acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of the
state’s modernity and identity.”25

24

Sagan and Waltz, The Spread, 34.
Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International
Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 73–85, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273.
25
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As history demonstrates, nuclear weapons do not operate as traditional means of security,
as their source of security lays in their unuse.26 However, despite the unconventional means of
security nuclear weapons offer, they are nevertheless the ultimate source of security for the elite
group of states who have them. Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of
national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and
internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of
modernity and identity.27
It is undeniable that nuclear weapons are a source of national security, however, the
means by which security is established is wholly unlike the methods that conventional weapons
utilized in the past. The source of security centers around identity. Rather than relying on the
normative defense mechanisms offered by conventional weapons, nuclear weapons act as
emblems of full sovereign status for states.28 Accordingly, nuclear programs, civilian and
military, are an essential element of sovereign status. The significance these weapons have is a
result of their existence as value-laden “icons,” within a highly structured international
normative order. Suchman and Eyre argue that “beyond their strategic potential, technologically
sophisticated militaries have come to symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence.”29 This
assertion positions the strategic potential of nuclear weapons to be on the same plane as their
symbolic function.
Nuclear proliferation is a political compulsion, in a similar way that flags act as emblems
of a sovereign state, so do these kinds of weapons.30 Much like flags, nuclear weapons are
26

Murray, Michelle. "Deconstructing Nuclear Deterrence I: Nuclear Deterrence as Discourse" Lecture, Nuclear
Proliferation 326. Bard College, NY, February 11, 2019.
27
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International
Security 21 (Winter 1996/97): 55.
28
Mark C. Suchman, and Dana P. Eyre. "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction
of Weapons Proliferation." Sociological Forum 7, no. 1 (1992): 139.
29
Suchman and Eyre."Military Procurement,” 139.
30
Suchman and Eyre."Military Procurement,” 139.
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essentially an item on a checklist that states are prompted to complete. The completion of this
checklist indicates that the state has all of the elements deemed essential to being considered
modern. Itty Abraham posits that states arm not because weapons perform a particular security
function—they are effectively useless as instruments of national defense—but rather because
such practices are constitutively linked to the maintenance of sovereignty and state identity. He
explains that “becoming a state necessitates that others recognize you as such, and this is
accomplished in part through conformity to a ritualized set of material practices.”31 Further
establishing that in order to be a state it must have a modern military, nuclear weapons are a
prerequisite for being a powerful state. This understanding, paired with social identity theory,
allows for nuclear proliferation to be more straightforward and logical.
The moment states “go” nuclear marks an extraordinary moment for not only that state
but for the international community as well. It is a techno-political event on a mass-scale,
involving the planning of an explosive release of nuclear energy. Abraham describes this as the
unambiguous moment a country has crossed over a particular set of political and technological
boundaries.32 Most directly, the institutional argument suggests that states procure arms simply
because such actions are an inherent part of the “independent,” “modern” nation-state. This is
simply to say that states pursue nuclear weapons because that is what states are supposed to do.
Again demonstrating that nuclear proliferation is a political compulsion, because “to be
recognized as possessing a ‘full degree of statehood’ a country must...be capable of maintaining
its territorial integrity and political independence.”33 The consequence of this argument is that
nation-states are “born arming.” Regardless of the nation’s “need” for a robust military, when

31

Itty Abraham, "The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories," Osiris 21, no. 1 (2006): 51,
https://doi.org/10.1086/507135.
32
Abraham, "The Ambivalence," 51.
33
Suchman and Eyre."Military Procurement,” 150.
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nations are born arming, the top priority is the military, regardless of whether or not such
organizations are imperative to the state.34
This view reaffirms nuclear weaponry as one of the essential elements of sovereign
status. The Indian nuclear program is an excellent example of this. For India, nuclear weapons
were the ultimate source of security, but not for defense. The legitimizing value offered by
nuclear weapons was ultimately more important than objects of defense. It was necessary for
India’s security. In the Indian case for example, atomic energy was the necessary means for
preventing recolonization and setting newly gained independence on a solid foundation.35 For
Nehru, the central political problem, post independence, was to be taken seriously on the
international stage: to create political legitimacy for the postcolonial state.36 Nuclear
proliferation was the ultimate solution.

“Nuclear Club” Identity
As military sophistication comes to signify a commitment to modernity, the pressure to
procure advanced hardware becomes virtually irresistible. However, despite the irresistibility
even highly institutionalized organizational forms often begin as rational responses to functional,
technological, or political pressures.37 Sociologist Mark C. Suchman and analyst Dana P. Eyre
argue that if we instead take weapons seriously not only as tools of destruction but also as sacred
symbols, we may gain a better understanding of the role of war in our worldview and of the role
of the warrior in our cultural ethos. Ultimately, they suggest that we may find that to prevent the

34

A. F. Mullins, Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1987.
35
Abraham, "The Ambivalence," 62.
36
Abraham, "The Ambivalence," 62.
37
Suchman and Eyre."Military Procurement,” 155.
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irrationality of armed conflict we must first understand the nonrational meanings that we have
constructed for our acts of arming and for our armaments themselves.38
Nuclear programs, for civil and defense purposes, are effective means for state
advancement. Suchman and Eyre discuss the utility of military advancement as being valuable
both practically and politically in their article “Military Procurement as Rational Myth”. In
contrast to more traditional arguments, which view the proliferation of objects of national
security as the result of rational security decisions, Suchman, and Eyre emphasize their
significance as value-laden icons within a highly structured international normative order. They
argue that beyond their strategic potential, technologically sophisticated militaries have come to
be the dominant symbol of modernity and independence. Saying that, “[e]ven in the absence of
actual or potential interstate conflict, the possession of arms often constitutes a significant part of
the military's power, particularly in systems where coups are a prominent feature of the political
process.”39
Beyond this, the military may seek these materialized structures not only as a route to
power but also as an end in itself. Therefore, military procurement reflects broader efforts to
consolidate state power.40 Nuclear programs are a means to state advancement. It should come as
no surprise that the periods of dramatic structural improvement in the United States coincide
with moments of intense fear. Considering the social effects of Cold War fears in his article
Nuclear Pasts, Nuclear Futures, Joseph Masco writes “It is no coincidence that the era of the
most intense Cold War nuclear fears was also the era that built infrastructures, created the terms
of international regulations over dangerous technologies, invested in higher education as well as

38

Suchman and Eyre."Military Procurement,” 157.
Elting Elmore Morison. Men, Machines, and Modern times. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016.
40
Suchman and Eyre."Military Procurement,” 144.
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science and engineering, and created the first round of environmental laws.”41 These periods of
state advancement are spurred by the anxiety of becoming inferior, and these measures attempt to
curtail that fear.

Case Studies
This set of case studies looks at how nuclear weapons are used and what their utility is, if
they even have one. In order to discuss the wide range of motivations and use, I will be using
France and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as case studies. The nuclear
programs of these two states are both technologically impressive and sources of national pride.
In examining the differences and similarities in the cases of France and the DPRK, I will discuss
what nuclear weapons are for. In doing so, these cases underline the argument that the strategic
use for nuclear weapons is not defensive, in the traditional understanding.
In order to demonstrate the unorthodox utility that comes from nuclear proliferation and
the procurement of nuclear weapons, I will examine the French nuclear program. I will discuss
what the motivations are for states to “go” nuclear if not for the purpose of strategic defense. I
will also question if a state can justify prioritizing this kind of project over the basic state welfare
programs. The French case exposes how irresponsible nuclear proliferation can be and it
undercuts the notion that nuclear weapons are defensive weapons. Then, I will look at the North
Korean program to consider

41
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France
In the French case, nuclear weapons development was a reaction to World War II and the
Nazi Occupation that destroyed French infrastructure. Following the war, France found itself to
be positioned as a secondary power, with the markers of prestige crucial to Great Power status
seemingly unattainable. The priority of French foreign policy in the post-war era became
hyper-focused on reestablishing its position in the international order as a Great Power.42 For the
French, nuclear weapons held great significance as they were indicative of status, and were,
therefore, essential to rebuilding France as a Great Power. France sought out to embody the
distinctive attributes of Great Powers in order to reclaim the status it once had.
When considering the role that nuclear weapons play in shaping state identity, SIT must
be taken into account. SIT explains how individual identity is shaped by membership in a
particular social group.43 According to this theory, if a state experiences a decline in status, the
state will engage in identity management strategies, specifically competition and mobility, to
reverse this perceived decline. Therefore, based on the assumptions of social mobility strategy
specifically, states participate in social assimilation strategy in order to improve their status. The
French example demonstrates that the ultimate utility of nuclear weapons is symbolic, and they
do not operate as objects of strategic defense, in the way that conventional weaponry does.
Additionally, France prioritized building their nuclear program over rebuilding the
country after the war. This kind of behavior is not only morally impracticable but also irrational.
France decided to focus on building unusable weaponry instead of welfare programs for their
people that were desperately needed after the war. This aspect of the French case is interesting
for two reasons. The first because it demonstrates how SIT informs the reasoning behind nuclear
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acquisition, which is applicable in the case of al-Qaeda as they are clearly mimicking the
behavior of states as a way to elevate and legitimize their status. The second because of the stark
difference in behavior between France and Daesh. France prioritized their nuclear program above
everything else when the country was in ruins because it needed to be a Great Power again.
Daesh on the other hand had a completely different to-do list. Daesh prioritized establishing state
infrastructure and social programs first, recognizing that a functional state is essential for nuclear
proliferation. Ultimately, the behavior and priorities of Daesh are more responsible and rational
than that of France.

DPRK
In the case of the North Korean program, the lines are blurred. Though the ultimate goal
of this program is recognition, the North Korean program was not concerned with their program
being representative of national identity. While the French were fixated on emphasizing the
“Frenchness” of their program, North Korea was not bothered by who developed their program
as long as it was in their control at the end of the day. The intentions of the North Korean
program have historically been understood to be intended for deterrence, domestic legitimacy,
international prestige, and coercive diplomacy.
The effects that the North Korean program has domestically and internationally are
unique to the regime, as it is the only nuclear state that is a totalitarian regime. From the view of
North Korea, nuclear proliferation is very reasonable, as the acquisition of these weapons
effectively achieves foreign policy objectives that would otherwise have to be fulfilled another
way. Regime survival is of the utmost importance and by deterring allied attacks North Korea is
shielded from the violence of adversaries. The North Korean program, despite the missing
element of national identity, is a source of national pride. The development of this nuclear
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program confirms that the regime is of equal status with the United States. A significant outcome
that is symbolic more than anything else is the unprecedented power the North Korean program
has to undermine the U.S.-South Korean alliance. They are able to undermine this otherwise
sound alliance by planting seeds of doubt that Washington would come to Seoul’s defense once
the American homeland is under nuclear threat. 44
Ultimately, the utility of nuclear weapons for North Korea is a means if gaining equal
status with the United States, and a way to avoid being completely dependent of China. North
Korea has been in pursuit of gaining formal recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Like all other
proliferators, North Korea understood that there are particular characteristics that distinguish the
Great Powers from lesser powers, Therefore, membership in the nuclear club became the means
to being recognized as an equal. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho told the UN General
Assembly that Pyongyang’s ultimate goal is to “establish the balance of power with the United
States.”45
In each of these cases, nuclear weapons are procured as a means of elevating their status
in the international sphere. Nuclear weapons held great significance as they were indicative of
status, and were, therefore, essential to projecting the image of the state of being in line with the
Great Powers. France, Iran and North Korea similarly developed their nuclear programs after
voicing the desire for equal status in the international order. In the French case, what mattered to
De Gaulle was “to be able to say that France was politically a nuclear power.” Later De Gaulle
stated “...a nation is nothing if she does not have the nuclear weapon,”46 which further clarified
the position nuclear programs maintain in the international normative order.
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So then, what is the purpose of nuclear weapons, if not for strategic defense? Nuclear
weapons are objects that are symbolic of status, not objects of strategic defense. States utilize
these weapons in order to symbolize their power, modernity, legitimacy as well as project a
perceived national identity.

Means of acquisition
There are three possible avenues groups may explore in their pursuit of acquiring a
nuclear weapon: building it, stealing it, or receiving it as a gift from a country that has a nuclear
program. To build such a weapon requires advanced technologies, infrastructure, funding, and
first class scientists. Schelling argues that the process of either developing a weapon or
convincing a state to provide one requires an ability to operate with a clear organizational
mission that is stable across time.47 Additionally, McIntosh and Storey point out that nuclear
development by any terrorist group “would place scientists and scientific approaches quite
literally at the center of their thinking about nuclear weapons.”48
Stealing a nuclear device is getting progressively more challenging. Within contemporary
international norms, the importance of safeguarding nuclear material is a shared priority. This
common agenda was made clear in the Nuclear Security Summit process which sought to
increase efforts by states to “secure nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials will impede
the ability of a non-state terrorist group to buy, build, or steal a bomb.”49
The scenario where a nuclear device is gifted to a non-state group is a highly
sensationalized one that has been made to seem more likely than it is in reality. A situation where
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a group receives not only a nuclear device, but also technology to enable delivery, is not out of
the question but it is highly improbable. In the event this were to happen, the state providing the
device would only consider giving it to their most capable allied group. McIntosh and Storey
recognize that “while size and wealth are hardly guarantors of rationality, overcoming the
significant barriers to nuclear capability would minimally require internal discipline, welldeveloped hierarchies of command, and the capacity for long-term planning.”50 All of these
requirements are characteristic of a highly strategic organization. There is very little reason that a
nuclear state would provide a non-state group with the same capabilities, and even if a state were
interested in doing so, the guaranteed political and economic backlash make this scenario
implausible. Afterall, states value nuclear weapons because of their symbolic significance, not as
real defensive weapons. If nuclear desire is rooted in Social Identity theory, a state would not
rationally give that up just to arm an allied non-state group.
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Terrorists as Rational and Strategic Actors
Terrorism as rational
The claim that terrorists are rational and strategic actors is usually met with some
pushback. Terrorists are portrayed in pop-culture as irrational and unpredictable, but that is not
historically accurate. Hoffman explains that historically, terrorist groups are relatively
conservative in their tactical choices and given the stakes involved are especially likely to look to
state strategies as a means of informing their own.51 When viewed through the lens of state
strategy, the actions of non-state groups are often comparable to the actions of states.
Terrorism is exceptionally rational. Generally, even the most extreme and unusual forms
of political behavior follow an internal strategic logic. Martha Crenshaw explains that if there are
“patterns in a group’s behavior instead of random idiosyncrasies in their actions, it is possible
that a strategic analysis will reveal said patterns.”52 Similarly, McIntosh and Storey suggest that
treating these organizations as being strategic actors is less convoluted than treating them as
“little states.”53 They argue that treating them as strategic actors is ultimately the most
straightforward, though deductive, framework available that allows the multifaceted nature of
terrorist groups to be considered without oversimplifying them. It is imperative to consider
terrorist groups as being strategic actors, because like strategic actors, they “assess options,
possess interests, and actively seek to make decisions that best match their organization’s actions
with their goals.”54 At the end of the day, the general reluctance and refusal to think of terrorist
groups as being rational and strategic actors undermines counterterrorism measures and
ultimately makes them ineffective. This is because the assessment of the group in question is
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flawed at its core. The issue with imagining terrorist groups as irrational actors is that if policies
are based on this assumption, and this assumption is wrong, then the policies are unproductive.
I find Lionel McPherson’s understanding of terrorism to be the most relevant in the
context of this discussion. He believes it to be the deliberate use of force against ordinary
noncombatants, where violence is a means for political ends.55 McPherson considers the morality
of terrorism, compared to conventional war. He says “many people believe that terrorism is
necessarily and egregiously wrong.” This is the view that he considers to be dominant.
McPherson explains that while this perspective appears to be morally correct and incontestable,
this dominant view is more complicated than it appears to be at first glance. This view maintains
that terrorism is akin to murder. If terrorism is the same as murder then that “forecloses the
possibility that terrorism, under any circumstance, could be morally permissible.”56 In other
words, this view puts forward that all terrorism is wrong, no matter what. This view contends
that terrorism is so morally unacceptable as a means that in order to label it as wrong and
illegitimate it’s unnecessary to even consider the political objectives of those who engage it.57
This view however, is complicated by the problem of definition. There is no definition that is
universally accepted, so how can this undefined ambiguous form of political violence be
distinctively wrong or entirely irrational, and illegitimate?
Once this dominant view is reconsidered, the primary challenge for those who believe
that terrorism is distinctively wrong is accounting for noncombatant casualties of conventional
war.58 As it becomes clear that terrorism and conventional war are not as different as one
intuitively believes, the dominant view’s notion that terrorism is destinctively wrong must be
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reevaluated. McPherson’s comparison between terrorism and conventional war is upheld even
when wars are fought according to international law, codified in the 1977 Geneva Protocol I on
International Armed Conflicts. 59 So, while terrorism might be morally objectionable, such
reasons apply equally to conventional war. Granted, the laws of war are not beyond moral
scrutiny. Therefore, using violence to bring about change is not inherently worse, from a moral
point of view, than using violence to prevent such change.60
At the end of the day, all terrorism involves the quest for power. This pursuit can be for
the power to dominate and coerce, to intimidate and control. Ultimately, terrorism seeks to effect
fundamental political change, while the means they employ are designed to achieve their end
goals. As a result of this quest, terrorists plan their operations to be carried out in such a way that
will send a message. Ideally, it will shock the international community, impress their
constituents, and intimidate their adversaries. Hoffman says that by planning their attacks in this
way, they ensure that their acts are “sufficiently daring and violent to capture the attention of the
media and, in turn, of the public and government as well.”61 He makes the claim that terrorists
are rational in their employment of such violent acts. Although terrorism is “often erroneously
seen as indiscriminate or senseless, terrorism is actually a very deliberate and planned
application of violence.”62 Put differently, the goal is “to ensure maximum damage done with
minimum loss of life,”63 in order to make a statement, without undermining their claim to
legitimacy, or stifling their end goal.
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In the case of nuclear weapons, this logic is taken further with the argument that there are
few realistic demands that terrorists can make by threatening the use of such indiscriminate
weapons and little that they can accomplish by using them that they could not achieve otherwise.
In other words, the terrorists’ aims and objectives could just as easily be realized through less
extreme measures than the detonation of a nuclear device. If a non-state group were to go
nuclear, they would participate in nuclear deterrence and in doing so gain legitimacy. Although
these groups wouldn’t become states if they were to go nuclear, they would become legitimate,
whether the global powers like it or not. Terrorists imitate governments, and nuclear weapons are
in the arsenals of the world’s major powers. That makes them legitimate.64
Terrorists would not detonate a nuclear weapon because the effects it would have would
not benefit the terrorists, or advance their aims. Michael Jenkins explores the idea of terrorists
going nuclear in his article “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” and he explains why he does not think
that the prospect of a terrorist group with nuclear capabilities is as horrific as we imagine it to be.
He argues this idea saying, “terrorist actions have tended to be aimed at producing immediate
dramatic effects, a handful of violent deaths—not lingering illness, and certainly not a population
of ill, vengeance-seeking victims.”65 Jenkins does not think that detonating a nuclear weapon
would be at all rational for a terrorist group to do because if they were to detonate such a weapon
they could not halt the continuing effects of their act. He supports this claim by examining the
habits of terrorist groups. He says that “it has not been the style of terrorists to kill hundreds or
thousands. To make hundreds or thousands of persons terminally ill would be even more out of
character.”66
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If killing civilians is seen as collateral damage then some forms of terrorism may not be
as far from conventional wartime killing as one might think.67 The doctrine of double effect
reiterates the importance of intentionality and allows combatants to kill civilians when their
deaths are unintended, although foreseen, side effect of a necessary military operation.68 The
doctrine of double effect supports the argument that terrorist groups are more ethical than states,
as it is centered around intention. Terrorists engage in violence as a last resort, to bring about
change, and often to fight oppression. States engage in violence to suppress and combat change.
When considering intentionality, using violence to bring about change is not inherently worse
from a moral point of view than using violence to prevent such change,69 especially if the change
that is being fought over is freedom.

Terrorist Groups
The following sections look at individual terrorist groups. I will examine why terrorist
groups want to acquire a nuclear weapon and how they would possibly use it. To consider the
differences and similarities between terrorist groups I will be discussing Al Qaeda, Daesh,
Atomwaffen Division (AWD) and Aum Shinrikyo because of their organizational characteristics
and capabilities. I have chosen these four groups because I believe that they are, or were at one
point, in a position where nuclear acquisition is possible. Additionally, al-Qaeda and Aum
Shinrikyo have demonstrated an unmatched commitment and interest in nuclear acquisition. I
will first introduce each group, discuss their objectives, consider each group’s nuclear desires
and probable means of acquisition, and finally I will offer an analysis of how these groups would
likely behave once going nuclear.
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It’s easy to put all terrorist groups together in the same category, putting al-Qaeda, Daesh,
Aum Shinrikyo, ETA, the Atomwaffen Division, KKK and IRA all under the same umbrella.
While yes, these groups all do meet the outlined definition of terrorism, they are not similar
enough to be tossed together. Daesh and Al Qaeda would act very differently than their
accelerationist counterparts, Aum Shinrikyo and Atomwaffen Division. Terrorism is far from
monolithic, but much of the literature on it makes over generalizations.
Atomwaffen Division (AWD), Aum Shinrikyo, Daesh and Al Qaeda are the primary
groups of concern when it comes to nuclear terrorism. All of these groups have expressed an
interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon, and have taken steps to do so. These groups diverge when
it comes to their motivations. AWD and Aum Shinrikyo are similarly motivated because they are
both “apocalyptically minded” and believe in accelerationism. Whereas Daesh and al-Qaeda are
motived by establishing a caliphate and hope to remove all foreign influences in Muslim
countries. The threat posed by AWD is unique because of who they are as a group, but also who
the members are. AWD is remarkably dangerous because of their presence in the US
government. Members of far-right groups, including AWD, exist as key personnel in important
federal institutions, like the courts and the military.70 This conflict of allegiance creates an
environment for insider threats to proliferate. More than that, there is a very real possibility that
the far-right could infiltrate nuclear facilities, where they could access sensitive information and
nuclear materials. It would be a terrible mistake to overlook their potential.71
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From a realist perspective, Daesh and al-Qaeda are doing exactly what is expected of
them. They are concerned with state building and in order to achieve their goals, they will mimic
the behavior of states. If given the opportunity, al-Qaeda would likely follow in France’s
footsteps of prioritizing a nuclear program to establish legitimacy and credibility. Osama Bin
Laden defended his expressed interest in nuclear weapons by saying that “if America used
chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear
weapons.”72
Similarly, groups belonging to the far-right, like AWD, view nuclear weapons as useful
tools to bring about a societal collapse that will result in total revolution. This genre of terrorist
groups who adopt accelerationism hope to set off a series of violent chain events, with violence
begetting more violence, destabilizing society. Indiscriminate, highly destructive acts of
terror—like a nuclear attack—are therefore perfect tools to sow chaos and accelerate this societal
collapse. Earnhardt, Hyatt, and Roth argue that the nuclear terrorism threat posed by far-right
groups “is amplified today by an ideology focused on accelerating the collapse of society and a
documented interest in pursuing nuclear terrorism.”73 While the foundational ideology of AWD
and Aum are not too similar, their motivations and apocalyptic desires are strikingly alike.
Senior Brookings Fellow Daniel Byman discusses the divergent goals and targets of
Daesh and Al Qaeda in his article “Comparing Al-Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different
targets.” He says that although the goal of al-Qaeda is to ultimately overthrow the corrupt
regimes in the Middle East (calling them apostate regimes) and replace them with real Islamic
governments, al-Qaeda’s primary enemy is the United States. Al Qaeda sees the United States as
being the root cause of the central problems in the Middle East. The group views the United
72
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States as an occupier and articulates goals that are much like independence and manifest destiny.
By targeting the embassies and spaces with ties to the United States, Al Qaeda hopes to
eventually prompt the United States to withdraw troops from the Middle East and Africa, and
end support for these Muslim state regimes, thereby withdrawing from the region altogether.
Ideally, this would leave these ‘apostate’ regimes vulnerable to attack from within, and with time
popular support for a caliphate will proliferate.74
If these four groups were to be placed on a spectrum, al-Qaeda is perhaps the least likely
to detonate a nuclear weapon if they were able to acquire one, and AWD the most likely.
Al-Qaeda mimics state behavior and has expressed an understanding and appreciation for the
strategic opportunities offered by the possession of nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda’s behavior is
remarkably similar to the behavior of states, which makes sense since they have aspirations of
establishing a caliphate themselves. While they are more extreme than al-Qaeda, Daesh
demonstrates a sophisticated level of organization and has a power structure that supports a
broad spectrum of government capabilities and an expansive bureaucratic apparatus. AWD is
apocalyptic in nature and dreams of establishing a white ethnostate or whites-only utopia,
viewing the Turner Diaries as a manifesto and roadmap. They believe that only extreme violence
will allow them to realize this fantasy. Aum, like AWD is an accelerationist group that is
apocalyptically minded, however they are motivated by the prospect of inciting armageddon.
Aum envisions a scenario where a nuclear armageddon destroys the world as we know it and in a
Noah's Ark-like scenario, only the loyal Aum followers would be spared.
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Strategies and Behavior
Acts of terror are designed to create a response. As a tactic, terrorism is utilized as way to
meet their ends through military means. This expression of violence generally utilizes three
specific methods of action. Disorientation, target response, and gaining legitimacy. First,
disorientation is designed to drive a wedge between citizens and governmental authorities. This
alienates the people from the state, and eventually the government will appear to be incapable of
providing protection. Second, target response forces a government to respond in a way that
benefits the group. This method provokes the state to engage in response tactics that are either
illegal or unacceptable to their constituents, which then removes any chance of there being a
political middle-ground. Third, gaining legitimacy. This is a strategy that is consistent throughout
time periods and across ideological divisions. In this strategy, the terrorist group attempts “to
exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message and seek to
broaden support, often through the media or political front organizations.”75
Terrorism is political in nature and the violent acts that are carried out by terrorist groups
are a means to an end. Hoffman explains that “all terrorists exist and function in hopes of
reaching this ultimate end.”76 These means are highly calculated and strategic in nature, since
there is an understanding that their violence must be viewed by their constituents as being
proportional and not outrageously violent. The calculated violence is important to the terrorist
group’s image. Hoffman explains why there is such an emphasis on how the group appears to the
public, and why this impacts how they carry out attacks. He says that “publicity and attention are
paramount aims, but at the same time there is a conscious recognition that only if their violence
is properly calculated and at least in some way regulated will they be able to achieve the effects
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they desire and the political objectives they seek.”77 In other words, while publicity is an
important factor in advancing the group’s goals, the attacks should not go against the
proportionality of means principle just to get media coverage.
There is a general acceptance of Brian Jenkins’s assessment from 1975 that when
terrorists take violent action, they want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and
not a lot of people dead. Non-state groups are highly strategic in nature and their actions are
planned meticulously. In his book Hoffman says that “terrorism—contrary to popular
perception—is not a mindless act of fanatical or indiscriminate violence; rather it is a
purposefully targeted, deliberately calibrated method of pursuing specific objectives at
acceptable cost.”78 This idea of an acceptable cost upholds Just War Theory’s principle of
proportionality. The indignation of the terrorists is rarely uncontrolled, and almost always
carefully planned. He claims that “contrary to both popular belief and media depiction, most
terrorism is neither crazed nor capricious.” He argues that terrorist attacks are more often than
not premeditated and carefully calculated down to the last detail. The violent attacks carried out
by terrorist groups are unique to other forms of heinous violence because they are specifically
designed to communicate a message and are designed to further the goals of the group.79
Furthermore, for violence to become fruitful, for it to reach the stated aims, it should be
undertaken with a proper political base and intention.80 Terrorsim is theatre,81 non-state groups
participate by performing acts of symbolic significance.82 Oftentimes the attacks carried out by
these terrorist groups are highly symbolic, and work to somehow advance their cause. Terrorists
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want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Hoffman explains the rationality and the
claimed logic behind violence of this kind. He says, “these groups, accordingly, recognize the
need to tightly control and focus their operations in such a manner as to ensure both the
continued support of their local “constituencies” and the sympathy of the international
community.”83
Despite the potentially detrimental effects violent attacks can have on a group, Hoffman
says that they have a “clear appreciation both that violence has its limits and that, if used
properly, it can pay vast dividends.”84 In other words, the level of violence the group engages
with must stay within the bounds of what the terrorists’ “target audience” will accept, while still
communicating their message and advancing the groups end goals. This idea of calculated
violence is in line with the principle of proportionality of means. The legitimacy of terrorist
violence is upheld by Just War Theory since “terrorists often believe that violence is the only
course of action open to them that can advance their political objectives.”85 Therefore, violence is
the last resort.
Between these four groups, the behavior and strategic approaches of each are unique to
them. This is to say that each of these groups will act differently, and must be viewed as
independent from each other. All too often, nuclear terrorism is approached as a monolithic
threat. This approach makes generalizations about terrorist groups and their behavior, failing to
consider what it is about the group that has allowed them to survive and be in the position they
are in. If all terrorist groups were the same, they would not be so successful. The following
sections look at each specific group and consider the nature of the group, their motivations,
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availability of resources conducive for nuclear acquisition, and the strategic opportunities created
by acquisition.
In their article “Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear
Terrorism,” Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that even if a terrorist group were to
have the capacity to do so, a nuclear terrorist attack is the least likely outcome. McIntosh and
Storey offer three drawbacks that would inevitably result if a weapon were to be detonated: the
costs associated with an attack, the benefits forfeited in terms of the options foreclosed by using
the weapon, and the relative strategic value of alternative courses of action.86 With the possible
exception of AWD, the drawbacks would make detonation the least desirable option.
McIntosh and Storey say that there are four options available to groups once they are
armed that fall short of detonation. Latency, ambiguity, opacity, and blackmail. These options
depend on the conditions under which the organization will use the weapon and whether or not
the organization discloses the newly acquired nuclear capacity.87 Each available option allows for
the weapon to be used as a deterrent, and possibly as a bargaining chip. They say “each option
here...places the nuclear-armed group in a more powerful position vis-à-vis the target, conferring
advantages in terms of bargaining, leverage, and the ability to offer credible threats it would not
have if it did not possess the weapon.”88 For non-state groups these options create an opportunity
where they have close to equal power with states.

Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda was founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and a few others
during the Soviet–Afghan War. This group operates as a complicated network of Islamic
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extremists and Salafist jihadists, which can be broken down into two major components. There is
the ‘core’ and then there are the regional affiliates. Al-Qaeda is unique because of this structure,
they have the core, and then they have regional affiliates that are smaller scale militant groups
who subscribe to al-Qaeda’s ideology and align themselves with the goals of al-Qaeda by
incorporating the name of the core group into their own. The group was a network of networks.
In addition to these two major components al-Qaeda has also inspired ‘grassroot’ jihadists 89 and
the formation of small cells, and while these groups are not officially part of the organization,
they distort the size and scope of al-Qaeda. This distortion is ultimately beneficial to al-Qaeda
since it is almost impossible to determine how many members, supporters, and sympathizers it
has at any given time, making it seem even more unpredictable.
Al-Qaeda sees themselves as a kind of a vanguard organization. This vanguard identity
was fortified as al-Qaeda helped “kindred groups to facilitate the jihad they believed was
necessary to establish a global caliphate.”90 As an organization, al-Qaeda is highly organized and
has clear objectives. The overarching long-term goal was to establish a unified caliphate. Bin
Laden’s vision for al-Qaeda was for the caliphate to become a strong sovereign state.
Al-Qaeda has explicitly expressed a desire to establish a new Islamic state. The caliphate
is imagined to govern according to Sharia law, it would encompus all current Muslim states, and
all formerly Muslim states. Popular support was important. The establishment of such a caliphate
is a long term goal, and in the meantime the group engaged in violence that was calibrated, and
“pragmatic”91 in order to further this goal. Al-Qaeda’s approach to violence is a calculated one.
Al-Qaeda is unambiguous when it comes to motives.
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As far as the list of rational actors goes, al-Qaeda is at the top. Al-Qaeda raises the bar for
how groups should act if the goal is to be a rational actor, as they “behave almost exclusively
according to the principles of realpolitik.”92 Although it feels inappropriate to argue that
al-Qaeda is a role model for realpolitik, there is no doubt that it is an extremely compelling idea.
The central doctrines of Islamic extremism followed by al-Qaeda compelled them to act in
particular ways that happen to be in line with these principles.
On the surface, it’s easy to point to al-Qaeda as an irrational actor because of their
religious ‘fanaticism’, but they are a highly calibrated organization. Bin Laden did say one of the
reasons he was pursuing nuclear weapons was because he felt a divine justification for nuclear
procurement. Proclaiming that acquiring nuclear weapons is a “solemn religious duty”, with a
vision of using them to defend his co-religionists from the “Jews and Crusaders.”93 More
interestingly, al-Qaeda also expressed this desire in terms that are used by states. He argued that
having “nuclear weapons will improve security”94 because he saw them as a “deterrent”.95
Recognizing the potential power offered by nuclear weapons, they become an obvious means to
this end.96 Bin Laden famously said “if America used them against us we reserve the right to use
them.”97 If able to acquire one, there are a variety of ways al-Qaeda would likely use it. It’s
probable they would use it as a bargaining chip to finally force the US out of the Middle East,
and as a way to establish sovereignty for the caliphate.
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Al-Qaeda first sought to acquire usable nuclear materials in Sudan during the mid-1990s.
Despite their efforts, al-Qaeda got caught in a scam that involved “Red Mercury” and
radiological waste.98 After failing in Sudan, al-Qaeda became more determined to acquire usable
nuclear material, turning to Pakistani scientists for help. Alas, despite al-Qaeda’s determination,
there was little progress made in acquiring material, or constructing the infrastructure necessary
for such an endeavor. According to documents obtained during and after the invasion in 2001,
al-Qaeda may have tried, unsuccessfully, to purchase weapons from various countries, including
Russia.
Al-Qaeda has demonstrated their ability to plan, organize and execute large scale
operations. They have carried out six major attacks, including 9/11, embassy bombings, and the
USS Cole. In each case, the plans were developed years in advance,99 even going as far as to
stockpile their shipments of weapons and explosives, and starting and operating businesses with
the intention of them being safehouses in the future. Given the nature of nuclear weapons
development, acquisition, and preservation, these kinds of projects are not ones that can be
completed by just any group. Importantly, every successful nuclear weapons program to date has
been led by teams, rather than by single individuals.100 Team work makes the dream work.
More than any other group, al-Qaeda was in the best position to be the first nuclear
non-state. Al-Qaeda had many of the resources and attributes necessary to acquire nuclear
weapons. The group was seemingly well equipped. Its leaders were bent on acquiring nuclear
weapons; it had substantial financial and other resources; it had a state sanctuary (in some
respects, the Taliban were actually a front for al Qaeda).101 And on the supply side, they seemed
98

Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, viii.
Dominic Tierney, "The Twenty Years' War," The Atlantic, accessed August 23, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/496736/.
100
Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, 35.
101
Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, 46.
99

41
to be in a great position for this dream to become a reality. Especially since the radioactive
material was notoriously unsecure in the former Soviet Union, and they had a network of a few
nuclear scientists.
If any group was going to “go” nuclear, it was going to be al-Qaeda. So why didn’t they?
The full scope of difficulties is unclear, and it’s likely a combination of numerous factors. When
met with this question, a British government official said it was plausible that al-Qaeda had just
had so many other things going on at the same time that nuclear acquisition just fell through the
cracks. He said al-Qaeda “had too many projects running simultaneously—that’s a downside to
having a fluid, flexible organization.”102 It’s entirely possible that if some circumstances were
different, we would be living in a world with nuclear non-states. Thankfully not.

Daesh
Daesh is a Salafi-Jihadist militant organization based mainly in Syria and Iraq, engaging
with a particularly violent ideology. Daesh self-identifies as a caliphate, claiming religious
authority over all Muslims. At its height, Daesh controlled territory roughly the size of Great
Britain, which included about a third of Syria and almost half of Iraq, with the key cities of
Mosul and Raqqa.
The group’s goal is to establish a real Islamic caliphate, first in Iraq and Syria, eventually
establishing a global influence. During the Iraq War, Daesh joined the Iraqi insurgency under the
name Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but quickly started to lose its strength and influence. Things turned
around for Daesh in 2011 when the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and the onset of the
Syrian Civil War created a power vacuum, which AQI stepped in to fill.103 In 2013, the group
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changed its name from AQI to al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām (Daesh).
Throughout 2013 and 2014, Daesh gained territory in both Syria and Iraq, and in June, 2014
Daesh officially declared the establishment of the caliphate. In order for Daesh to be a legitimate
entity, it must have control of territory.
Despite being the “problem child of jihad”, Daesh is an extremely organized group with
an expansive bureaucracy. The government is structured, like many states are, in a top-down
bureaucracy. The territory held by the caliphate is organized as provinces, the bureaucracy is
split between civil and military branches, and ministry-like councils for every state function from
legal, media, and financial, to leadership, and intelligence councils. Clearly, the organizational
capabilities of Daesh are significant, and if the group reemerges it won’t have to start from
scratch.
In 2019 Daesh lost everything. Caliph Baghdadi was assassinated, the land that was once
the core of the caliphate was reclaimed by Syria and Iraq, and the surge of foreign fighter recruits
ended. Even with these major blows Daesh continues to be an active security threat, especially in
Afghanistan. If the group can successfully step into the power vacuum the US will create when
troops withdraw in September 2021, Daesh will have the opportunity to dominate the defense
landscape in Afghanistan. Daesh has positioned itself in such a way that they will take over
Taliban territory and have control of all infrastructure in that territory. This means that Daesh
could potentially have the infrastructure and systems to operate in a manner similar to a state.
Control of this kind of infrastructure creates endless defensive opportunities for Daesh.
Daesh views themselves as a legitimate state, and in many respects acts accordingly.
While their behavior is not as close to states as al-Qaeda’s, Daesh is more concerned with being a
caliphate than a state in the current Westphalian state system. So, while they might not be
profiles/islamic-state
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conducting themselves in a way states are expected to, they are acting in such a way they view as
permissible. Social assimilation was not as important to Daesh as it was to al-Qaeda, though
mimicking behavior is not entirely out of character for Daesh.
Unlike al-Qaeda, Daesh’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was not substantial when compared
with their other priorities. This contrast makes sense, Daesh is younger and smaller than
al-Qaeda. While Daesh was actively interested in a nuclear weapon, their primary focus was on
establishing their caliphate and developing institutions to ensure the needs of the people are met.
This approach is fascinating because it is hyper-rational.
When Daesh captured the city of Mosul in 2014, they suddenly were in control of one of
Iraq’s major cities. Mosul University was under Daesh control, where two caches of Cobalt-60
was being stored for medical use. Cobalt-60 is highly radioactive, useful in treating cancer, but
also can be a “core ingredient” of a nuclear explosive device. When Iraqi soldiers liberated
Mosul, they found that the Cobalt-60 was exactly where it was left in 2014.
The conclusion that government officials came to was that Daesh “failed to utilize it,
because they could not determine how to access the Cobalt-60 without exposing themselves to
deadly radiation.”104 However, I think this assessment is a dangerous one. When these kinds of
generalizations are carelessly made, similar claims proliferate, culminating in ill-informed
narratives, which shape public perception and the political imaginary.
To say that Daesh failed to utilize the Cobalt-60 because they couldn’t figure out how to
access it without exposing themselves is puzzling, to say the least. This explanation paints Daesh
as a group incapable of scientifically advanced projects and promotes the idea that Islamic
Extremist groups, such as Daesh, are just fanatical, primitive, and unintelligent militants who are
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lunatics. Given Daesh’s meticulous bureaucratic and financial system, and overall state-like
structure, it is clear that Daesh is a highly capable and competent terrorist group.
I think the idea that Daesh was essentially too stupid to do anything with the Cobalt-60
horribly underestimates Daesh’s capabilities. Additionally, the conclusion that officials came to
relies on the assumption that constructing a bomb was a priority for Daesh. This assumption
closely resembles the acquisition-use presumption, which is the idea that once a nuclear weapon
is acquired by a group, they will use it right away. The conclusion put forward above assumes
that once radioactive material is acquired by a group, they will use it to construct an explosive
device. This assumes that building such a device is a priority for the group, and in the case of
Daesh it is not.
Although a nuclear weapon was not a top priority for Daesh, it was still an area that was
being explored. In 2016 Belgian authorities discovered that members of Daesh were spying on a
nuclear scientist, and planning some sort of attack. This plot was discovered during the
investigation of the three coordinated suicide bombings in Belgium, two at the Brussels Airport
and one at the Maalbeek metro station, 32 civilians were killed and over 300 injured.105 Two
Belgian brothers, Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, were found to be responsible.
The perpetrators of the attacks were part of the Daesh cell in Brussels, which was also
involved in the 2015 attacks in Paris. Upon searching the home of the brothers authorities
stumbled upon “large quantities of explosives and bomb-making equipment.”106Authorities also
discovered they had been spying on a nuclear scientist who worked at the Tihange Nuclear
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Power Station, and speculated that they were assessing their target, and planning on using or
acquiring nuclear material from this facility.107 The Brussels cell is not necessarily reflective of
Daesh as a whole, which is important to note because the actions of individuals who are part of a
group do not always align with the goals of the group. From this example, it is clear that
although Daesh is not making nuclear material acquisition a priority, the group is not against it if
this some faraway cell is interested in pursuing it.
Like al-Qaeda, Daesh wants to reestablish a caliphate. Yes, the ideology Daesh follows is
of the doomsday variety, but that does not mean that they would use a nuclear weapon if they
had one for several reasons. Firstly, it does not make much sense to detonate a nuclear weapon
on territory it hopes to one day control. Secondly, a retaliatory attack by any nuclear state
guarantees a complete eradication of the group. Finally, all of the unique benefits and
opportunities offered by nuclear weapons are forfeited upon detonation.
Ultimately, Daesh has been unable to “demonstrate the capacity for the long-term
planning of state institutions and processes.”108 Although there is a lot of overlap between
al-Qaeda and Daesh, a major divergence is their approach to establishing a caliphate, and this is
clear in how they have each pursued nuclear weapons. Because al-Qaeda viewed a caliphate as a
far-off long term goal, they were able to pursue operations that required time. Viewing it as a
marathon, not a sprint. Whereas Daesh was eager to establish their caliphate as soon as possible,
and did not really care about popular support. At the end of the day, one of the major reasons
Daesh’s nuclear dreams were unable to come to fruition was the group’s failure to work as a
team on a long term project. This is not to say that Daesh’s leadership abilities were insufficient.
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Daesh prioritized establishing their caliphate over nuclear weapons. This choice is
hyper-rational, and the complete opposite of what France chose to do in 1960.

Atomwaffen Division (AWD)109
Founded in 2015, the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) is an American neo-Nazi terrorist
group, their name translates from German to “nuclear weapons division.” The name indicates an
obvious desire for nuclear weapons, while also alluding to the idea that they are part of a larger
far-right network, and specializing in nuclear weapons. AWD purposefully included “division” in
the name, which further suggests there are other divisions making up a larger corps. This group
has expressed an extreme desire to be violent. The group is decentralized by design, set up as a
web of intertwined cells, all working on instigating the collapse of civilization.
Members, who can be fairly described as accelerationism, believe that violence,
depravity, and degeneracy are the only sure way to establish order in their dystopian and
apocalyptic vision of the world. They see what they are doing as preparing for a race war, to
combat, as they say, the cultural and racial displacement of the white race.110 Given their desire to
wipe out civilization, the threat of mutually assured destruction that supports much of deterrence
theory is not very relevant in this case.
AWD is one of the most notable far-right groups that operates in the United States. AWD
was a byproduct of the Iron March (IM), which was an online fascist forum launched in 2011
and taken down in 2017. AWD also used the forum to traffic firearms.111 IM became the key
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online space for young neo-Nazis, interested in militant fascism to organize offline activism. The
organizational structure of AWD is set up to be a series of terror cells, working together to spark
the collapse of civilization.112 They are inspired by the ideas of accelerationism, which is the “the
modern breed of violent far-right extremism is becoming more destructive, and nuclear weapons
certainly fit into this profile of catastrophic violence.”113
The group’s ideology is best described as neo-Nazi accelerationism. AWD
Accelerationists believe that the modern, post-industrial society cannot be redeemed. Instead,
they believe it ought to be driven into apocalyptic collapse so a white ethnostate or whites-only
utopia can be constructed in its wake. AWD is modeled as a leaderless resistance movement,
with a network of so many diffuse cells, their prospects for acquiring a nuclear weapon seem
dim. Members of AWD tend to be younger than the average neo-Nazi supporter. They are the
first generation to have grown up online. Violence is fetishized, and viewed as the only realistic
way to initiate their end goal, racial cleansing. Such a purge is meant to lead to a national
socialist order replacing a world that, from the perspective of its members, is a dystopian,
apocalyptic hellscape where only the enemies of the white race profit and flourish.
On one hand, the groups' unmatched preference for extreme violence, and their complete
disregard for the world as we know it make the prospect of detonation plausible. On the other
hand however, nuclear weapons are not critical to starting a race war and they can settle for other
kinds of weapons. Despite their name, it’s not the end of the day if other weapons have to be
utilized instead. AWD wants to wreak havoc immediately, and for them if it can spark societal
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collapse, well then weapons are weapons. On top of their impatience, AWD is decentralized and
seemingly does not have the resources nuclear weapons require.
AWD is one of the most notable groups with nuclear aspirations, but they were not the
first far-right group in the US to express an interest in using radioactive or nuclear materials in an
attack. Over the past decade there have been countless plans and numerous failed attempts. In
2004, Demetrius Van Crocker, a National Socialist Movement member, tried to assemble a dirty
bomb114 with a plan “to detonate a radiological “dirty bomb” in Washington, D.C., or use poison
gas against black people.”115 In 2008, after the election of Barack Obama, James Cummings
began devising a plan to build a dirty bomb in preparation for the inauguration. Cummings was
able to buy thorium-232 and depleted uranium online and began to stockpile it as he collected the
other essential materials for a dirty bomb.116 In both of these cases, they were able to operate
undetected. The only reason authorities discovered Cummings’ stockpile and elaborate plans was
because they were investigating his home as a crime scene. His wife shot him, which was the
only reason authorities were even interested in the Cummings home.
AWD is unique because they are not interested in the strategic value of nuclear weapons,
and far more invested in them because of their capacity for sheer destruction. While AWD is a
small group of accelerationist neo-Nazis, the network of the far-right is enormous. As mentioned
earlier, their name means nuclear weapons division, as if they are a division within a larger
group. Much of the far-right come together online, which allows more people access to these
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ideas, and an individual can be a member of multiple groups, as many overlap anyway.
Therefore, evaluating the threat posed by AWD is especially challenging. Another factor that
makes these extremists remarkably dangerous is their presence in the US government. Members
of the far-right exist as key personnel in important federal institutions like the courts and the
military.117 This conflict of allegiance creates an environment for insider threats to proliferate.
More than that, there is a very real possibility that the far-right could infiltrate nuclear facilities,
where they could access sensitive information and nuclear materials.
Matthew Gebert is an unnerving example. While employed at the State Department,
working as a foreign affairs officer, Gerbert also was a host of the white supremacist podcast
“The Fatherland” where he spoke of his desire to build a country for whites only. He said
“[whites] need a country of our own with nukes, and we will retake this thing lickety split...that’s
all that we need. We need a country founded for white people with a nuclear deterrent.”118 This
language is fascinating because of how it positions nuclear weapons. He expresses a desire to
“build” a country, which is a radical shift in rhetoric from AWD’s apocalyptic visions of
destroying society. The most remarkable detail of this example is how Gerbert articulated the
value of nuclear weapons. Gerbert says “we need...a nuclear deterrent”, which indicates that he
recognizes and values the strategic benefits offered by nuclear weapons as well as the prospect of
sovereignty. While Gerbert is not a known member of AWD, this case highlights how expansive
and diffuse the far-right is.
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One of the founders of AWD, Brandon Russell is an example of just how intertwined the
far-right is with the government, at all levels. Not only was Russell in the Florida National
Guard, he also studied nuclear physics as an undergraduate and had a history of posting
instructions online for building improvised nuclear reactors.119 Along with other AWD members,
Russell was arrested in 2017 while on their way to the Turkey Point nuclear power plant, with
plans of launching explosives at it. While searching Russell’s apartment, police discovered that
his garage was stockpiled with explosives. Specifically, police found pipe bomb components,
traces of the explosive hexamethylene triperoxide diamine, and several detonators. As previously
noted, AWD idealizes Oklahoma City Bomber Timothy McVeigh, and they have turned to him
for inspiration. In the search police found ammonium nitrate and nitromethane, which is the
same combination used by McVeigh in 1995. They also recovered potassium chloride, red iron
oxide, potassium nitrate, and homemade fuses fashioned from brass 5.56 mm rifle cartridges.120
The indiscriminate nature of AWD’s weapons acquisition reveals how the group values
nuclear weapons. More than anything, AWD is interested in extreme and unrelenting violence,
and have no problem copying methods that ‘worked’, their copy of McVeigh’s bomb is an
example of this. As indicated my their name, members of AWD have an explicit interest in
nuclear terrorism, but they are not going to turn down other opportunities for violence just
because they are not nuclear. AWD has very little interest in the strategic value of nuclear
weapons, and is far more interested in their destructive capabilities. Unlike al-Qaeda and Daesh,
AWD has very little demonstrated interest in using a nuclear weapon for anything other than
detonation, and instead plans to “cleanse” society by killing as many people as possible. While
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the ultimate goal for the group is nuclear acquisition, their skill set and the resources available to
them are more compatible with conventional explosives. Conveniently for AWD, Radiological
Dispersal Devices (RDDs) combine conventional explosives, and radioactive material together to
make ‘dirty bombs’.

Aum Shinrikyo
Aum Shinrikyo is a Japanese doomsday cult, designated a foreign terrorist group by the
U.S. Department of State, which was founded by Shoko Asahara in 1984. Aum is best known for
their sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995.
Aum’s ideological framework is an apocalyptic, doomsday belief structure. Within this
structure, the world is divided into two opposing forces—good and evil.121 Shoko Asahara, the
founder of Aum, has outlined a doomsday prophecy that is unique to his followers, according to
him a Third World War will be instigated by the United States, where the epic final conflict
escalates to a nuclear 'Armageddon'.122 Members of Aum firmly believe they will survive after
the apocalypse is over, and therefore they have an incentive to trigger the apocalypse because
“their own salvation depends upon fighting the final conflict and eradicating the enemy.”123
Within this apocalyptic ideology, Aum professes that all of humanity will end after this
conflict. But rest assured, it’s not all bad news. While this belief clearly states that everyone will
die, Aum is sure to point out that it will not end for the ‘elite’ few who join them. 124 Ultimately,
Aum's mission is not only to inspire the pursuit of salvation, but also to survive these End Times.
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In order for this to happen, there must be the apocalypse, so they sought out to spark just that by
way of weapons of mass destruction.
Like AWD, Aum Shinrikyo cared far more about the destructive value offered by nuclear
weapons, than the strategic value. Nuclear weapons were desired but not crucial to the group’s
apocalyptic goals. In the early 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo began a quest to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. Aum began recruiting scientists and engineers to help with their project. The cult
had an impressive network and financial resources, which allowed them access to people and
spaces they might not otherwise have had. Aum recruited highly educated followers for the
purpose of gaining human capital. Among these followers were more than 300 scientists with
degrees in medicine, biochemistry, biology, and genetic engineering. This variety was great and
allowed Aum to diversify their scientific activities. They didn’t have to put all their eggs in one
basket so to speak, which is a rational decision and ensures low-risk if one of the operations fails.
Just one problem, Aum missed a very important basket.
For a group who is so interested in nuclear acquisition, the complete absence of nuclear
scientists is puzzling. Not only is a well coordinated team crucial for building nuclear weapons,
but the skill sets necessary are specific and non-negotiable. According to Carson Mark, a nuclear
weapons builder, a nuclear weapons team would “at a minimum require a nuclear scientist, a
mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer, and an explosives expert.”125 Their member’s skill
sets leaned more towards chemistry and biology, which is one explanation for why Aum was
ultimately more successful in developing chemical and biological weapons than nuclear.126
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At first, Aum hoped they would be able to exploit their relationships with high level
Russian officials, where they could buy nuclear materials in exchange for access to foreign
technologies. They focused their efforts on Russia as a potential source of nuclear weapons, but
despite Aum’s efforts to convert social capital into nuclear material, they were ultimately unable
to acquire a weapon. After this substantial setback, Aum shifted their focus away from buying a
weapon, and committed to building one instead. Asahara believed Australia would be unaffected
by Armageddon, so members invested in land to mine and enrich their own uranium there. Aum
bought a sheep farm at Banjawarn Station in 1993, as a place to test their chemical weapons and
mine uranium.127
Developing a nuclear capability is a huge commitment, especially if a group is enriching
the materials themselves. With time running out, and numerous failed attempts to mine uranium,
Aum abandoned the project – shifting focus again – and instead decided to focus on chemical
weapons. Time was running out for Asahra. In his predictions, Asahra claimed Armageddon
would start in 1995 so he needed to figure out how to make that happen. The nuclear weapons
option became too slow, laborious and complicated, so Aum decided to abandon Australia and
focus on developing chemical weapons. The chemical program was much more developed than
the nuclear program. Aum went full speed ahead with chemical weapons, and in March of 1995
Aum used sarin gas in the Tokyo subway as a way to “start” the Armageddon.
Aum expressed an explicit interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon, and took steps to
pursue it, but despite their impressive financial resources and human capital they were unable
and to successfully “go” nuclear. Aum was constrained by their own ideology, personel, and a
miscalculation of their relationships with Russian officials. Asahara, and Aum members valued
the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons more than the strategic benefits they offer.
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Ultimately, like AWD, Aum was interested in starting Armageddon above all else. If that meant
changing the way they would start it, that was acceptable.

Reevaluating the threat
Counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts are focused on Islamic extremism and
the focus of policies to counter nuclear terrorism has historically been on these external threats.
This shift was informed by an increase in armed insurgencies in the Middle East during the
1970s. The aftermath of the 1972 Munich massacre only intensified these fears, as it made clear
how global and devastating the impact of these kinds of events could be. In 1979, as the Iran
hostage crisis was shown on national television for over a year, the idea that ‘radical Islam’ was
a serious threat to America became popularized. Within the U.S. there is a perception that the
threat of nuclear terrorism is not a domestic issue. The threat is treated as if it is something
uniquely foreign, stemming from Islamist terrorism networks like Daesh and al-Qaeda. Although
flawed, this view is unsurprising in the post 9/11 world we live in. In reality, the threat of nuclear
terrorism is greatly domestic.
The far-right movement in the U.S. has a long history of nuclear terrorism ideation and
attempted procurement. This is not to say the focus should only consider the domestic threat of
nuclear terrorism, rather that the disproportionate emphasis, and almost exclusive focus on
Islamist groups is irresponsible and dangerous. The white-power movement was on the rise,
especially among Vietnam veterans. With combat experience and formal military training, these
men organized a ‘resistance’ movement against the federal government. Much like the far-right
today, they saw the government as the source of societal corrosion.
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The far-right movement over the last few decades has been informed and inspired by The
Turner Diaries, which was published in 1978. Often referred to as the “bible of the racist right,”
the book follows a group of right-wing extremists on their journey to invade the U.S. Capitol to
overthrow the U.S. government. The book serves as a road map for terrorist groups on the
far-right, ending with the main character detonating a nuclear bomb over the Pentagon. This is
the mission of groups like AWD. Their goal is to cause complete and total destruction of society.
The threat posed by Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and Daesh is entirely different than the
threat posed by the far-right. Al-Qaeda and Daesh mimic state behavior, are highly strategic, and
have a demonstrated interest in group survival, which is impossible if a nuclear weapon were to
be detonated. Both of these groups value nuclear weapons for their strategic significance, not for
the destructive capabilities, meaning they are interested in nuclear weapons, not RDDs.
Movements centered around accelerationism and apocalypticism do not value them for
the same reasons. Far-right terrorist groups like AWD pursue nuclear acquisition because of their
capacity for violence. The threat posed by groups like AWD is distressing because of their
interest in complete destruction, and disregard for society at large.
Because there has been an almost exclusive focus on foreign threats, groups belonging to
the far-right have been able to develop and expand. Members of these groups have been able to
successfully join federal institutions and the armed forces, infiltrating these spaces. The threat of
nuclear terrorism must be reevaluated and policy enacted accordingly. Only when the
acquisition-use presumption is eliminated, and groups analyzed as independent rational actors,
can the true threat of nuclear terrorism be understood.
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Conclusion
This paper aims to demonstrate that the monolithic understanding of nuclear terrorism,
which is based on the acquisition-use presumption, is inaccurate. The literature on nuclear
terrorism disproportionately focuses on examining how a group could go nuclear while failing to
consider what would happen once a weapon is acquired. Because of the dominance of the
acquisition-use presumption, there is a gap in the broader understanding of nuclear terrorism.
Specifically, this paper aims to demonstrate that the threat posed by nuclear terrorism is
less straightforward than often imagined. Nuclear terrorism is imagnined to be a monolithic and
external threat, informed by the acquisition-use presumption. The acquisition-use presumption
has contributed to how groups are generalized, and terrorism further essentialized.
This paper has demonstrated the shortcomings of such generalizations, and the four cases
selected highlighted the distinctive motivations, strategies, and goals of each group. The case
studies of France and the DPRK demonstrate that nuclear weapons do not operate as traditional
means of security, as their unuse is the source of security. These two cases reveal that the
strategic use for nuclear weapons is not defensive, but rather symbolic.
The examples of al-Qaeda, Daesh, AWD, and Aum Shinrikyo underscore just how broad
the ideological spectrum is. While these four groups were selected because of their demonstrated
interest in nuclear acquisition, this analysis has argued that the motivations and likely utilization
of each group are distinctive and should be explored as such. In order to highlight the differences
of each group I discuss them each individually. In all four cases, I introduce each group, discuss
their objectives, consider each group’s nuclear desires, probable means of acquisition, and then
offer an analysis of how these groups would likely behave once going nuclear. This approach

57
allows for each group to be considered individually and minimizes the likelihood of over
essentializing the strategic nature of each.
An important conclusion drawn from this paper was that terrorist groups must be
analyzed as individual entities who have distinct motivations, resources, and strategic
capabilities. Nuclear terrorism is not unique to Islamic extremist groups, and by focusing so
heavily on groups like al-Qaeda and Daesh, groups belonging to the far-right, like AWD, are able
to expand and go largely unnoticed. Finally, this paper has explored the nature of various threats
of nuclear terrorism. Ultimately, groups like al-Qaeda and Daesh are interested in nuclear
weapons for the same reasons states are, and for that reason the likelihood of detonation is low.
Whereas the threat of a dirty bomb, or radiological contamination is highest among groups on the
far-right like AWD, and the destructive capabilities nuclear weapons offer are more desirable
than their strategic value. If the research into this topic were to continue, one would expand the
scope of the research, beyond nuclear terrorism,to consider the implications and consequences of
essentializing terrorist groups.
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New Global Terrorism. New York: Henry Holt, 1999.
Litwak, Robert. Deterring Nuclear Terrorism. Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2016.

60
Mapping Militant Organizations. "The Islamic State." Stanford University. Last modified April
2021. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state
Masco, Joseph. "Nuclear Pasts, Nuclear Futures; or, Disarming through Rebuilding." Critical
Studies on Security 3, no. 3 (February 2, 2016).
McIntosh, Christopher, and Ian Storey. "Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood
of Nuclear Terrorism." International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 2 (June 2018).
McKnight, Gerald. The Mind of the Terrorist. London: Michael Joseph, 1974.
McLeod, Saul. "Social Identity Theory." Simply Psychology, October 24, 2019.
https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html.
McPherson, Lionel K. "Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?" Ethics 117, no. 3 (2007): 524-46.
https://doi.org/10.1086/512781.
Morison, Elting Elmore. Men, Machines, and Modern Times. 50th ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2017.
Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. "Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?."
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January
2010.
Mullins, A.F. Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1987.
Murray, Michelle. The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations. Status, Revisionism,
and Rising Powers. Kettering: Oxford University Press, 2019.
The New York Times. "Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui: From Bank Robbers to Brussels
Bombers." The New York Times. Accessed March 24, 2016.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/europe/expanding-portraits-of-brussels-bom
bers-ibrahim-and-khalid-el-bakraoui.html.
Nuclear Threat Initiative. "'Dirty Bomb' Materials Uncovered in Maine Residence." Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Accessed February 12, 2009.
https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/dirty-bomb-materials-uncovered-in-maine-residence/.
Oberhaus, Daniel. "Japan Just Executed the Leaders of an LSD-Fueled Doomsday Science Cult."
VICE. Last modified July 6, 2018.
https://www.vice.com/en/article/gy3xex/what-is-aum-shinrikyo-sarin-attack.
Roberts, Adam, and Richard Guelff. Documents on the Laws of War. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb."
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54-86. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273.

61

Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate.
NEW YORK: W W NORTON, 2013.
Sarkar, Jayita. "It's Time to Take Domestic Nuclear Terrorism Seriously." The Washington Post,
January 2021. Accessed May 1, 2021.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/27/its-time-take-domestic-nuclear-terr
orism-seriously/.
Scarborough, Isabelle L. "Securing a Seat at the Table des Grands: French Identity and the
Application of Identity Management Strategies in Post-War France." Senior Project, Bard
College, 2018.
Scheinman, Lawrence. Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic. Place of
publication not identified: Princeton University Pres, 2016.
Schelling, Thomas C. "Nuclear Deterrence for the Future." Issues in Science and Technology 23,
no. 1 (Fall 2006).
Shane, Leo. "Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism up Again in Poll of Active-duty Troops."
Military Times. Accessed February 6, 2020.
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-supre
macy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/.
Smith, Peter R., and Dr M. L. R. Smith. "Strategic Terrorism: The framework and Its Fallacies."
Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 571-95.
Dr (2005) Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 28:4, 571-595, DOI: 10.1080/01402390500300923
Southern Poverty Law Center. "Atomwaffen Division." Hate Watch (blog).
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/atomwaffen-division.
———. "U.S. State Department Official Involved in White Nationalist Movement, Hatewatch
Determines." Hate Watch (blog). https://www.splcenter.org/gebert.
Suchman, Mark C., and Dana P. Eyre. "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the
Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation." Sociological Forum 7, no. 1 (1992):
137-61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/684356.
Thompson, A. C. "An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down. What
Path Officials Took Is a Mystery." Pro-Publica. Accessed November 20, 2018.
https://www.propublica.org/article/an-atomwaffen-member-sketched-a-map-to-take-the-n
eo-nazis-down-what-path-officials-took-is-a-mystery.
Tierney, Dominic. "The Twenty Years' War." The Atlantic. Accessed August 23, 2016.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/496736/.

62
Waldman, Amy. "Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka." The New York
Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/world/masters-of-suicide-bombing-tamil-guerrillas
-of-sri-lanka.html.
Ward, Antonia. "Is the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic
Threats?" RAND Blog.
https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention
.html.
"Why Does North Korea Want Nukes?" BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-40733644.
Williams, Michael C. "Rethinking the 'Logic' of Deterrence." Alternatives: Global, Local,
Political 17, no. 1 (1992): 67-93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644732.
Witte, Casey Ann. "Decisions, Decisions: A Look at Government Decision-Making in Response
to the Threat of Terrorism." Senior Project, Bard College, 2019.

